Rasmi Elasmar

I am a researcher at Google DeepMind, where I work on methods for understanding and mitigating real-world harms, misbehavior, and misalignment in AI.

Publications

Double Blind Evals: Resolving the Dual Confidentiality Dilemma in AI Safety Auditing

Andrew Trask, Sol Messing, …, Rasmi Elasmar Andrew Trask, Sol Messing, Vai Pahwa, Pegah Maham, Rene Kolga, Austin Frantz, Andrew Tash, Kate Thomas, Sean McGregor, George Balston, Patricia Paskov, Miles Brundage, Akriti Vij, Bennett Hillenbrand, Alexandros Karargyris, Tin Acosta, Joel Fenster, Madeleine Eilish, Rasmi Elasmar, Myriam Khan, Koen van der Veen, Rasswanth S, Sameer Wagh, Stephen Gabriel, Pedro Werneck, Lacey Strahm, Kevin McDonough, Ronnie Falcon, Kristian Lum, William Isaac

Technical report · August 2026 · DeepMind Blog · PDF

AI safety evaluations often involve sensitive prompts and proprietary models. Evaluators want to keep their evaluation prompts secret from model owners to prevent purposeful or incidental data leakage, ensuring longer usefulness of their benchmark. Model owners in turn wish to keep their proprietary model weights and inference code within their own secure infrastructure to protect their IP. We present a way forward for “double-blind evals”, which provide cryptographic guarantees that an evaluator’s prompts are not shared with the model owner, while simultaneously maintaining the confidentiality of the model weights and inference code. To accomplish this, we use secure enclaves that encrypt data in RAM at the hardware level. In a world-first pilot, we test this approach by evaluating a proprietary Google DeepMind model (Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite) against a selection of the private AILuminate benchmark corpus, using an NVIDIA H100 secure enclave on Google Cloud Platform, and using OpenMined’s PySyft to maintain data and model privacy. We believe this effort marks the first use of this technology to provide mutual secrecy for one organization’s a frontier-class proprietary model weights and another organization’s closed benchmark.

Evaluating Language Models for Harmful Manipulation

Canfer Akbulut, Rasmi Elasmar Canfer Akbulut, Rasmi Elasmar, Abhishek Roy, Anthony Payne, Priyanka Suresh, Lujain Ibrahim, Seliem El-Sayed, Charvi Rastogi, Ashyana Kachra, Will Hawkins, Kristian Lum, Laura Weidinger

Under review · March 2026 · arXiv · PDF

Interest in the concept of AI-driven harmful manipulation is growing, yet current approaches to evaluating it are limited. This paper introduces a framework for evaluating harmful AI manipulation via context-specific human-AI interaction studies. We illustrate the utility of this framework by assessing an AI model with 10,101 participants spanning interactions in three AI use domains (public policy, finance, and health) and three locales (US, UK, and India). Overall, we find that that the tested model can produce manipulative behaviours when prompted to do so and, in experimental settings, is able to induce belief and behaviour changes in study participants. We further find that context matters: AI manipulation differs between domains, suggesting that it needs to be evaluated in the high-stakes context(s) in which an AI system is likely to be used. We also identify significant differences across our tested geographies, suggesting that AI manipulation results from one geographic region may not generalise to others. Finally, we find that the frequency of manipulative behaviours (propensity) of an AI model is not consistently predictive of the likelihood of manipulative success (efficacy), underscoring the importance of studying these dimensions separately. To facilitate adoption of our evaluation framework, we detail our testing protocols and make relevant materials publicly available. We conclude by discussing open challenges in evaluating harmful manipulation by AI models.

Multi-turn Evaluation of Anthropomorphic Behaviours in Large Language Models

Lujain Ibrahim, Canfer Akbulut, Rasmi Elasmar Lujain Ibrahim, Canfer Akbulut, Rasmi Elasmar, Charvi Rastogi, Minsuk Kahng, Meredith Ringel Morris, Kevin R. McKee, Verena Rieser, Murray Shanahan, Laura Weidinger

ICLR 2026 · February 2025 · arXiv · PDF

The tendency of users to anthropomorphise large language models (LLMs) is of growing interest to AI developers, researchers, and policy-makers. Here, we present a novel method for empirically evaluating anthropomorphic LLM behaviours in realistic and varied settings. Going beyond single-turn static benchmarks, we contribute three methodological advances in state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLM evaluation. First, we develop a multi-turn evaluation of 14 anthropomorphic behaviours. Second, we present a scalable, automated approach by employing simulations of user interactions. Third, we conduct an interactive, large-scale human subject study (N=1101) to validate that the model behaviours we measure predict real users' anthropomorphic perceptions. We find that all SOTA LLMs evaluated exhibit similar behaviours, characterised by relationship-building (e.g., empathy and validation) and first-person pronoun use, and that the majority of behaviours only first occur after multiple turns. Our work lays an empirical foundation for investigating how design choices influence anthropomorphic model behaviours and for progressing the ethical debate on the desirability of these behaviours. It also showcases the necessity of multi-turn evaluations for complex social phenomena in human-AI interaction.

Generative AI Misuse: A Taxonomy of Tactics and Insights from Real-World Data

Nahema Marchal, Rachel Xu, Rasmi Elasmar Nahema Marchal, Rachel Xu, Rasmi Elasmar, Iason Gabriel, Beth Goldberg, William Isaac

ICML 2024 Workshop on Humans, Algorithmic Decision-Making and Society (Accepted talk) · June 2024 · arXiv · PDF

Generative, multimodal artificial intelligence (GenAI) offers transformative potential across industries, but its misuse poses significant risks. Prior research has shed light on the potential of advanced AI systems to be exploited for malicious purposes. However, we still lack a concrete understanding of how GenAI models are specifically exploited or abused in practice, including the tactics employed to inflict harm. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of GenAI misuse tactics, informed by existing academic literature and a qualitative analysis of approximately 200 observed incidents of misuse reported between January 2023 and March 2024. Through this analysis, we illuminate key and novel patterns in misuse during this time period, including potential motivations, strategies, and how attackers leverage and abuse system capabilities across modalities (e.g. image, text, audio, video) in the wild.